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SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR CONVEX SEPARABLE
OPTIMIZATION OVER INTEGRAL POLYMATROIDS
TOBIAS HARKS∗, MAX KLIMM† , AND BRITTA PEIS‡
Abstract. We study the sensitivity of optimal solutions of convex separable optimization prob-
lems over an integral polymatroid base polytope with respect to parameters determining both the
cost of each element and the polytope. Under convexity and a regularity assumption on the func-
tional dependency of the cost function with respect to the parameters, we show that reoptimization
after a change in parameters can be done by elementary local operations. Applying this result, we
derive that starting from any optimal solution there is a new optimal solution to new parameters
such that the L1-norm of the difference of the two solutions is at most two times the L1-norm of the
difference of the parameters.
We apply these sensitivity results to a class of non-cooperative games with a finite set of players
where a strategy of a player is to choose a vector in a player-specific integral polymatroid base
polytope defined on a common set of elements. The players’ private cost functions are regular,
convex-separable and the cost of each element is a non-decreasing function of the own usage of
that element and the overall usage of the other players. Under these assumptions, we establish the
existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. The existence is proven by an algorithm computing a pure
Nash equilibrium that runs in polynomial time whenever the rank of the polymatroid base-polytope
is polynomially bounded. Both the existence result and the algorithm generalize and unify previous
results appearing in the literature.
We finally complement our results by showing that polymatroids are the maximal combinatorial
structure enabling these results. For any non-polymatroid region, there is a corresponding optimiza-
tion problem for which the sensitivity results do not hold. In addition, there is a game where the
players’ strategies are isomorphic to the non-polymatroid region and that does not admit a pure
Nash equilibrium.
Key words. polymatroid; submodular function; sensitivity; reoptimization; integer optimiza-
tion; non-cooperative games; congestion games; pure Nash equilibrium.
AMS subject classifications. 05B35; 90C27; 91A10; 91A46.
1. Introduction. We consider polymatroid optimization problems, where the
objective is to distribute d ∈ N discrete units among a set of elements E = {1, . . . ,m}
so as to minimize a convex separable cost function subject to upper bounds on the
total amount of units allocated to subsets of elements. These upper bounds are defined
via values of an integral polymatroid rank function f : 2E → N. Formally, we study
the following optimization problem:
(P (t, d))
minimize
∑
e∈E
Ce(xe; te)
subject to:
∑
e∈U
xe ≤ f(U) for all U ⊆ E
∑
e∈E
xe = d
xe ∈ N for all e ∈ E,
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where the functions Ce : N× N → R+, e ∈ E are non-decreasing and discrete convex
in the first entry and f is a normalized, monotone and submodular set function. The
vectors t = (te)e∈E ∈ N|E| and d ∈ N are integral parameters. For fixed parameters,
this problem is a convex-separable optimization problem over an integral polymatroid
base polytope and can be solved in polynomial time by greedy algorithms; see Feder-
gruen and Groenevelt [9], Groenevelt [16], Hochbaum and Shanthikumar [22] and the
book by Fujishige [11]. Besides these appealing theoretical properties, the problem
has applications in several areas ranging from scheduling problems (cf. Yao [42] and
Krysta et al. [27]), and tree packing and matroid optimization (cf. Gabow [13]) to
game-theoretic applications (cf. He et al. [21]).
1.1. Sensitivity Analysis. Suppose we are given an optimal solution x∗(t, d)
with respect to t and d. The main question addressed in this paper is: How does
the structure of an optimal solution change after changes to the parameters t and d?
We motivate this question by a concrete example. Let G = (V,E) be a connected
undirected graph with vertex set V and edge set E ⊆ (V × V ). The objective is to
compute k ∈ N spanning trees of G so that along each spanning tree a message of
unit size can be sent. If xe ∈ N messages are sent along edge e, i.e., e is contained in
exactly xe spanning trees, the resulting (average) delay is defined as
Ce(xe;ue) =
{
1
ue−xe
, if xe < ue,
+∞, else,
where Ce(xe;ue) is a standard M/M/1-delay function frequently used in queueing
theory [14, 26]. The parameter ue ∈ N denotes the installed capacity on edge e. The
problem to compute k spanning trees to minimize the total delay can be cast as a
convex separable integral polymatroid optimization problem by taking f as the k-th
multiple of the rank function of the graphic matroid on G. In this model, it is natural
to ask how optimal solutions change if the edge capacities or k are changed.
1.2. Our Results for the Sensitivity of Polymatroid Optimization. The
change of an optimal solution for changed parameters clearly depends on the structural
dependency of the objective function and the feasible region on the parameters t
and d. To capture this dependency, we introduce the following concept of regularity.
Informally, we call a function C(x; t) regular, if (i) the (left discrete) partial derivative
with respect to the first entry is a nondecreasing function in the parameter; (ii) the
left discrete partial derivative with respect to the first entry is not larger after a unit
increase of the parameter t than after a unit increase of x.
Our main results (Theorem 3.2, Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 3.5) can be informally
summarized as follows: Let x∗(t, d) be an optimal solution of P (t, d) for regular and
convex functions Ce, e ∈ E. Then, for any other integral parameters t′, d′, there exists
a new optimal solution x∗(t′, d′) close to x∗(t, d) in the following sense:
‖x∗(t, d) − x∗(t′, d′)‖1 ≤ 2‖t− t
′‖1 + |d− d
′|.
Moreover, given x∗(t, d), we can compute x∗(t′, d′) by performing ‖t− t′‖1 + |d− d′|
elementary exchange steps.
In the context of the tree packing example with M/M/1 queueing functions dis-
cussed in § 1.1, this sensitivity result implies that if the capacity vector is changed,
say by p units, then there is a new optimal solution for which at most 2p edges of
the given spanning trees needs to be changed, and these changes can be efficiently
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computed from the initial optimal solution. On the other hand, when k is increased
by p units, then at most p|V | units need to be changed since adding a single additional
spanning tree corresponds to adding |V | new units.
In § 6, we show that submodularity of the capacity function defining the base
polytope is necessary for the sensitivity results above in the following sense: For any
capacity function that is not submodular, both sensitivity results (in terms of a change
of t and d) do not hold anymore.
1.3. Our Results for Polymatroid Games. Our sensitivity results have con-
sequences for the existence of pure Nash equilibria for a new class of non-cooperative
games that we term polymatroid games. In such a game, there is a finite set of players
N and a finite set of resources E. Each player i ∈ N distributes her demand di ∈ N
in integral units among the resources subject to player-specific submodular capacity
constraints. This way, the resulting strategy space for each player forms an integral
polymatroid base polytope (truncated at the player-specific demand). We further
assume that the private cost function is defined as a sum of regular, player-specific,
non-decreasing, convex cost functions Ci,e(xe; te), where the parameter te is inter-
preted as the load contribution of other players to resource e. This class of games
includes as special cases the following variants of congestion games that have been
treated separately in the literature.
(i) congestion games with matroidal strategies and player-specific costs (studied
by Ackermann et al. [2]) for the case that the submodular capacity function
is the rank function of a matroid;
(ii) integer-splittable congestion games with singleton strategies (studied by Tran-
Thanh et al. [40]) for the case that the submodular capacity function is equal
to a sufficiently large constant;
(iii) integer-splittable congestion games with matroidal strategies (the matroidal
counterpart of integer-splittable congestion games studied by Rosenthal [35])
for the case that the submodular capacity function is an integer multiple of
the rank function of a matroid.
We show the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium and devise an algorithm for its com-
putation for polymatroid games thus generalizing and unifying the existence results
by Ackermann et al. and Tran-Thanh et al. Our algorithm maintains preliminary de-
mands, strategy spaces, and strategies of the players that all are set to zero initially. In
the course of the algorithm the demands of the players are increased iteratively by one
unit and a preliminary pure Nash equilibrium (with respect to the current demands)
is recomputed by following a sequence of best response moves of the players. While
similar algorithms have been proposed before for matroid congestion games (cf. Ack-
ermann et al. [2]) and integer-splittable singleton games (cf. Tran-Thanh et al. [40]),
the main difficulty is to show that the sequence of best responses converges even in
the more general setting of polymatroid games. This is where the sensitivity results
for polymatroid optimization shown in § 3 are applied. Furthermore, we show that
the runtime of the algorithm is bounded by n2mδ3, where n is the number of players,
m the number of resources, and δ is an upper bound on the maximum demand. Thus,
for polynomially bounded δ, the algorithm is polynomial.
In § 6, we prove that submodularity of the players’ capacity constraints is neces-
sary for the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in a strong sense. For any mono-
tonic, normalized, strictly positive, and non-submodular set function defining the
player-specific base polytope, there is a two-player game without a pure Nash equilib-
rium. In this sense, our results are best possible and polymatroids are the maximal
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combinatorial structure guaranteeing the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium.
1.4. Related Work.
Sensitivity in Polymatroid Optimization. Fujishige et al. [12] studied convex-
separable minimization problems over polymatroid base polytopes. They conduct
a sensitivity analysis of optimal solutions for the case that the marginal cost func-
tion is (component-wise) shifted downwards. As their main result, they show that
for any downwards shift of the marginal cost function, any new optimal solution has
the property that all optimal cost values of the components decrease monotonically
with respect to the original optimal solution. Their motivation is to analyze the
Braess paradox, and their sensitivity result implies that there is no Braess paradox
in polymatroids. A difference to our work lies in the fact that we conduct a quanti-
tative sensitivity analysis, that is, given an optimal solution for an initial parameter,
we quantify exactly the difference of a closest new optimal solution for a changed
parameter.
He et al. [21] considered separable-concave maximization problems over polyma-
troids in which each cost function component has a second parameter and is concave
in the parameter. They assume that the cost functions are discrete convex in both
entries. A further difference to our setting is that we consider as feasible domain an
integral polymatroid base polytope instead of an ordinary polymatroid (defined by a
real-valued submodular function). Their main result establishes (without any further
regularity assumptions) that the optimal value function as a function of the param-
eter, or as a function of the support set of the objective function, is submodular.
These two result have important consequences for game-theoretical models, because,
using the submodularity of the optimal value function, they show that the joint re-
plenishment game and the one-warehouse multiple retailer game is submodular and,
thus, has desirable properties in terms of existence of core solutions. In contrast to
the work of He et al. [21], we study in this paper sensitivity properties of underlying
optimal solutions and not the optimal value function. Moreover, the structure of an
integral polymatroid base polytope differs from an ordinary polymatroid. The integral
polymatroid base polytope does not form a lattice when considering the component-
wise minimum and maximum as join and meet. Thus, the sensitivity framework of
Topkis [39, 38] (to which also He et al. [21] refer) is not directly applicable.
Cook et al. [7] considered general integer programs of the form max{wx | Ax ≤ b}
and conducted a proximity and sensitivity analysis. The proximity analysis is con-
cerned with the difference of optimal solutions for integer linear programs and their
continuous relaxations, respectively (the difference is measured by the L∞− or L1-
norm). The sensitivity analysis investigates the difference of optimal solutions of an
integer linear program for changed b. Their main result shows that the L∞− dis-
tance to the nearest optimal solution to the corresponding integer program is at most
the number of variables multiplied by the largest sub-determinant of A. Baldick [4]
strengthened some of the sensitivity and proximity results of Cook et al. [7] by intro-
ducing a finer measure for the constraint matrix A.
Murota [33] and later Moriguchi et al. [31] derived proximity results for the min-
imization of M-convex functions in integer variables (see Murota [32] for an intro-
duction to this concept). Moriguchi et al. [31] showed for convex-separable objective
that the difference between integral and fractional optimal solutions measured in the
L1-norm is at most 2(n− 1), where n is the number of variables.
Congestion Games. Rosenthal [34] introduced congestion games, a class of strate-
gic games, where a finite set of players competes over a finite set of resources. Each
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player is associated with a set of allowable subsets of resources, e.g., implicitly given
by a combinatorial property. A pure strategy of a player is to choose a subset from
this set. In the context of network games, the resources correspond to the edges of
a graph and the allowable subsets correspond to the paths connecting a given source
and a given sink. The cost of a resource depends only on the number of players choos-
ing the same resource and each player strives to minimize the sum of the costs of the
resources contained in the selected subset. In this general model, Rosenthal proved
the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium by a potential function argument. Up to
date congestion games have been used as reference models for decentralized systems
involving the selfish allocation of congestible resources (e.g., selfish route choices in
traffic networks [5, 36, 41] and flow control in telecommunication networks [24, 25, 37])
and for decades they have been a focal point of research in (algorithmic) game theory,
operations research and theoretical computer science.
In the past, the existence of pure Nash equilibria has been analyzed in many
variants of congestion games such as singleton congestion games with player-specific
cost functions (cf. [15, 23, 29, 30]), congestion games with weighted players (cf. [2, 3,
6, 10, 17]), nonatomic and atomic splittable congestion games (cf. [5, 20, 25, 41]) and
congestion games with player- and resource-specific and variable demands (cf. [18]).
Rosenthal proposed congestion games with integer-splittable demands as an im-
portant and meaningful model already back in 1973 in his first work on congestion
games [35] even published prior to his more famous work [34]. Despite this long
history, not much is known regarding existence and computability of pure Nash equi-
libria. Rosenthal gives an example that shows that pure Nash equilibria need not exist
for integer-splittable congestion games in general. Dunkel and Schulz [8] strengthened
this result showing that the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in integer-splittable
congestion games is NP-complete to decide. Meyers [28] proved that in games with
linear cost functions, a pure Nash equilibrium is always guaranteed to exist. For
singleton strategy spaces and nonnegative and convex cost functions, Tran-Thanh et
al. [40] showed the existence of pure Nash equilibria. They also showed that pure Nash
equilibria need not exist (even for the restricted strategy spaces) if cost functions are
semi-convex. Our results generalize the existence result of Tran-Thanh et al. towards
general polymatroid strategy spaces.
Parts of the results of this paper have been presented by the authors in less general
and preliminary form in the Proceedings of the 10th Conference on Web and Internet
Economics [19].
2. Preliminaries. Let N denote the set of nonnegative integers and let E be a
finite and non-empty set of elements. We write NE shorthand for N|E|. Throughout
this paper, vectors x = (xe)e∈E ∈ NE will be denoted with bold face. An integral set
function f : 2E → N is submodular if f(U) + f(V ) ≥ f(U ∪ V ) + f(U ∩ V ) for all
U, V ∈ 2E ; f is monotone if f(U) ≤ f(V ) for all U ⊆ V ⊆ E; and f is normalized
if f(∅) = 0. We call an integral, submodular, monotone, and normalized function
f : 2E → N an integral polymatroid rank function. The associated integral polyhedron
is defined as
Pf :=
{
x ∈ NE : x(U) ≤ f(U) for all U ⊆ E
}
,
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where for a vector x = (xe)e∈E and U ⊆ E, we write x(U) shorthand for
∑
r∈U xe.
For an element e ∈ E, we write x(e) instead of x({e}). Given the integral polyhedron
Pf and an integer d ∈ N with d ≤ f(E), the d-truncated integral polymatroid Pf (d) is
defined as
Pf (d) :=
{
x ∈ NE : x(U) ≤ f(U) for all U ⊆ E, x(E) ≤ d
}
.
The d-truncated integral polymatroid Pf (d) is again an integral polyhedron as the
corresponding integral polymatroid rank function f ′ : 2E → N defined as f ′(U) =
min{d, f(U)} is submodular. For a d-truncated integral polymatroid Pf (d), the cor-
responding integral polymatroid base polyhedron is defined as
Bf (d) :=
{
x ∈ NE : x(U) ≤ f(U) for all U ⊆ E, x(E) = d
}
.
The rank of Bf (d) is given by d. We consider the problem of minimizing a parametrized
separable discrete convex function over a polymatroid base polytope.
minimize
∑
e∈E
Ce(xe; te)(P (t, d))
subject to: x ∈ Bf (d),
where t = (te)e∈E ∈ NE , d ∈ N are nonnegative integral parameters.
Note that t influences the cost function while the parameter d defines the trunca-
tion of the integral polymatroid base polytope. Let x∗(t, d) ∈ NE be an optimal solu-
tion to P (t, d). We are interested in quantifying the distance between x∗(t, d) and a
new optimal solution x∗(t′, d′) for the new parameters t′ ∈ N and d′ ∈ N. We will mea-
sure the distance between solutions using the L1-norm defined as ‖x‖1 :=
∑
e∈E |xe|
for all x ∈ NE . Thus, we are interested in bounding ‖x∗(t, d)−x∗(t′, d′)‖1 in terms of
‖t− t′‖1 and |d− d′|. Naturally, non-trivial bounds are only possible when imposing
additional assumptions on the dependence of the cost function on the parameter.
To state this assumption formally, we need the following notation of discrete
derivatives. For a function c : N→ R+ and x ∈ N, let
c−(x) := c(x) − c(x− 1) and c+(x) := c(x+ 1)− c(x)
denote the left and right discrete derivative, respectively. Note that the left derivative
is only defined for x ≥ 1. The function c is called discrete convex, if c−(x) ≤ c+(x) for
all x ∈ N. For a function C : N × N → R+, we slightly abuse notation as we denote
by
C−(x; t) := C(x; t) − C(x− 1; t) and C+(x; t) := C(x+ 1; t)− C(x; t),
the left and right derivatives, respectively, with respect to the first argument. We call
C discrete convex, if x 7→ C(x; t) is discrete convex for all t ∈ N.
We introduce the following notion of regularity that bounds the impact of a
parameter change on the derivative.
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Definition 2.1 (Regularity). A function C : N× N→ R is called regular, if
C−(x; t) ≤ C−(x; t+ 1) for all x, t ∈ N,(2.1)
C−(x; t+ 1) ≤ C−(x+ 1; t) for all x, t ∈ N.(2.2)
In words, (2.1) requires that the (left) marginal cost function of C is nondecreasing
in t and (2.2) bounds the marginal cost of C after adding one unit to parameter t in
terms of the marginal cost after adding one unit to x. It can be shown that a regular
function C is discrete convex.
Observation 1. A regular function C : N× N→ R is discrete convex.
Proof. We calculate
C−(x; t) ≤ C−(x; t+ 1) ≤ C−(x+ 1; t) = C+(x; t),
where for the first and second inequality we used (2.1) and (2.2), respectively.
Throughout this work, we impose the following assumption on Ce, e ∈ E.
Assumption 1. For every e ∈ E, Ce is regular.
If P (t, d) only involves cost functions satisfying Assumption 1, we speak of a
convex and regular optimization problem.
We recapitulate the motivating example given in § 1.1 and state it as a convex
and regular optimization problem.
Example 1. Let G = (V,E) be a connected undirected graph. The objective is to
compute k ∈ N spanning trees of G with minimum cost so that along each spanning
tree a message of unit size can be sent. If xe ∈ N messages are sent along edge e, the
resulting cost per edge is defined as
Ce(xe;ue) =
{
1
ue−xe
, if xe < ue,
+∞, else.
By defining u = maxe∈E ue and te = u − te for all e ∈ E, we obtain an equivalent
problem in which the cost functions are of the form Ce(xe; te) = 1/(u− te− xe). This
problem involves regular cost functions, because ∂Ce(xe; te)/∂xe = 1/(u− te − xe)2 is
increasing in te, thus, (2.1) is satisfied. Moreover, one easiliy verifies that also (2.2)
is satisfied.
3. Sensitivity Results. For fixed parameters t ∈ NE , d ∈ N, we recapitulate
the following necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for an optimal solution to
problem P (t, d). Let χe ∈ NE be the indicator vector with all-zero entries except for
the e-th coordinate which is 1. For x ∈ Bf (d) and e ∈ E denote by
De(x) = {g ∈ E \ {e} | x+ χg − χe ∈ Bf (d)}
the set of feasible local exchanges w.r.t. x and e and by
∆e(x; t) =
{
ming∈De(x) C
+
g (xg; tg), if De(x) 6= ∅,
+∞, else,
the minimum alternative cost when exchanging e. The following theorem gives a
necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality of a solution of a polymatroid
optimization problem.
Theorem 3.1 (Fujishige [11]). x∗ ∈ Bf (d) is an optimal solution for P (t, d) if
and only if C−e (x
∗
e; te) ≤ ∆e(x
∗; t) for all e ∈ E.
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Using these conditions, we proceed to establish the first sensitivity result which
relates optimal solutions for changed values of t.
Theorem 3.2. Let P (t, d) be a regular convex optimization problem with optimal
solution x∗(t, d) and let t′ = t+ χe∗ for some e
∗ ∈ E. Let
g∗ ∈
{
argming∈De∗ (x∗(t,d)){C
+
g (xg; tg)}, if De∗(x
∗(t, d)) 6= ∅,
{e∗}, else.
Then the better of the two solutions, x∗(t, d) and x∗(t, d)− χe∗ + χg∗ , is optimal for
P (t′, d).
Proof. When De∗(x
∗(t, d)) = ∅, then x∗(t, d) trivially satisfies the optimality
conditions of Theorem 3.1 for any parameter vector t′ and there is nothing left to
show. Thus, let us assume De∗(x) 6= ∅. Let x = x∗(t, d) and y = x− χe∗ + χg∗ 6= x.
First, consider the case C−e∗(xe∗ ; te∗ + 1) ≤ ∆e∗(x; t). We claim that then x is
still an optimal solution to P (t′, d) as it satisfies the optimality conditions
C−e (xe; t
′
e) ≤ ∆e(x; t
′) for all e ∈ E.(3.1)
To see this, note that by Assumption 1 (using (2.1)) we get ∆e(x; t
′) ≥ ∆e(x; t) for
all e ∈ E as t′e ≥ te. This directly implies that (3.1) is satisfied for all e 6= e
∗. To see
the inequality also for e∗, observe that
C−e∗(xe∗ ; t
′
e∗) = C
−
e∗(xe∗ ; te∗ + 1) ≤ ∆e∗(x; t) = ∆e∗(x; t
′),
where for the last equality we used that C+g (xg ; tg) = C
+
g (xg; t
′
g) for all g 6= e
∗.
Second, consider the case C−e∗(xe∗ ; te∗ +1) > ∆e∗(x; t). We proceed to show that
then y is optimal for P (t′, d) by checking the optimality conditions of Theorem 3.1
for all e ∈ E = {e∗} ∪ {g∗} ∪E \ {e∗, g∗}.
Case (A): e = e∗. We obtain
C−e∗(ye∗ ; te∗ + 1) = C
−
e∗(xe∗ − 1; te∗ + 1) ≤ C
−
e∗(xe∗ ; te∗) ≤ ∆e∗(x; t),
where the first inequality follows by the regularity of Ce∗ and the second since x is
optimal for P (t, d). Thus, the optimality conditions for e∗ are satisfied if ∆e∗(x; t) ≤
∆e∗(y; t
′). To prove the latter inequality, we first show that De∗(y) ⊆ De∗(x). As-
sume by contradiction that there is g ∈ De∗(y) \De∗(x). This implies x−χe∗ +χg /∈
Bf (d). Hence, there must exist T ⊂ E with g ∈ T, e∗ /∈ T and f(T ) = x(T ). On the
other hand, g ∈ De∗(y) implies y′ := y − χe∗ + χg = x − 2χe∗ + χg + χg∗ ∈ Bf (d).
Using g ∈ T, e∗ /∈ T, x(T ) = f(T ), this implies y′(T ) ≥ x(T ) + 1 = f(T ) + 1, hence,
y′ /∈ Bf (d), a contradiction.
Finally, let us show ∆e∗(x; t) ≤ ∆e∗(y; t′). This is trivial if De∗(y) = ∅. Other-
wise, we obtain
∆e∗(x; t) = min
g∈De∗ (x)
{C+g (xg; tg)} = C
+
g∗(xg∗ ; tg∗) ≤ C
+
g∗(yg∗ ; tg∗) = C
+
g∗(yg∗ ; t
′
g∗)
where for the inequality we used discrete convexity. Moreover, we obtain for all
g′ ∈ De∗(x) \ {g∗} the inequality
∆e∗(x; t) = min
g∈De∗ (x)
{C+g (xg; tg)} ≤ C
+
g′(xg′ ; tg′) = C
+
g′ (yg′ ; t
′
g′).
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Putting things together, we get
∆e∗(x; t) ≤ min
g∈De∗ (x)
C+g (yg; t
′
g) ≤ min
g∈De∗ (y)
C+g (yg; t
′
g) ≤ ∆e∗(y; t
′).
Case (B): e = g∗. For a contradiction, assume that there is g ∈ Dg∗(y) with
(3.2) C−g∗(yg∗ ; t
′
g∗) > C
+
g (yg; t
′
g).
Note that g 6= e∗ since
C−g∗(yg∗ ; t
′
g∗) = C
−
g∗(yg∗ ; tg∗) = C
+
g∗(xg∗ ; tg∗)
< C−e∗(xe∗ ; te∗ + 1) = C
+
e∗(ye∗ ; te∗ + 1) = C
+
e∗(ye∗ ; t
′
e∗),
a contradiction to (3.2). Thus, g ∈ Dg∗(y) \ {e∗}. We obtain
y − χg∗ + χg = x− χe∗ + χg ∈ Bf (d)
which implies g ∈ De∗(x). Since g∗ minimizes C+g (x; t) among all g ∈ De∗(x), we get
C−g∗(yg∗ ; t
′
g∗) = C
−
g∗(yg∗ ; tg∗) = C
+
g∗(xg∗ ; tg∗) ≤ C
+
g (xg ; tg) = C
+
g (yg; t
′
g) contradict-
ing (3.2).
Case (C): e ∈ E \ {e∗, g∗}. Assume by contradiction that there is g ∈ De(y)
with
(3.3) C−e (ye; t
′
e) > C
+
g (yg; t
′
g).
We first treat the case g = e∗ where (3.3) becomes
(3.4) C−e (ye; te) > C
+
e∗(ye∗ ; te∗ + 1).
With e∗ ∈ De(y), we get y − χe + χe∗ = x − χe + χg∗ ∈ Bf (d), hence, g
∗ ∈ De(x).
We get
C+e∗(ye∗ ; te∗ + 1) < C
−
e (ye; te)(using (3.4))
= C−e (xe; te)(using e ∈ E \ {e
∗, g∗})
≤ C+g∗(xg∗ ; tg∗)(since x was optimal for t)
< C−e∗(xe∗ ; te∗ + 1)(since x was not optimal for t
′)
= C+e∗(ye∗ ; te∗ + 1),(since y = x− χe∗ + χg∗)
a contradiction.
From now on we may assume g ∈ E \ {e∗}. We claim that the following two
properties are satisfied:
(a) x− χe + χg∗ ∈ Bf (d),
(b) x− χe∗ + χg ∈ Bf (d).
This claim has also been used in the proof of Theorem 4.11 in Fujishige [11]. In order
to keep our analysis self-contained, we provide an alternative proof of fact (a) and (b)
below.
Before proving these properties, however, we show that they give the desired
contradiction to (3.3). First note that (a) implies g∗ ∈ De(x) which together with
the optimality of x for t implies C−e (ye; t
′
e) = C
−
e (xe; te) ≤ C
+
g∗(xg∗ ; tg∗). Similarly,
(b) implies g ∈ De∗(x) which, by the choice of g∗, implies C
+
g∗(xg∗ ; tg∗) ≤ C
+
g (xg; tg).
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Finally, we have C+g (xg; tg) ≤ C
+
g (yg; tg) = C
+
g (yg; t
′
g) by discrete convexity and the
fact that yg ≥ xg for all g ∈ E \ {e∗}. Combining all three inequalities, we obtain
C−e (ye; t
′
e) ≤ C
+
g (yg; t
′
g), a contradiction to (3.3).
It remains to prove properties (a) and (b). Denote
y′ := y − χe + χg = x− χg∗ + χe∗ − χe + χg ∈ Bf (d).
We will first show that x − χe + χg /∈ Bf (d). Assume by contradiction that
x− χe + χg ∈ Bf (d). We then obtain
C−e (xe; te) = C
−
e (ye; t
′
e) > C
+
g (yg; t
′
g) = C
+
g (yg; tg) ≥ C
+
g (xg ; tg),(3.5)
where for the first identity we used e ∈ E \{e∗, g∗}, the first inequality used (3.3), the
second identity used g 6= e∗ and the last inequality used g 6= e∗, discrete convexity
and yg ≥ xg for all g ∈ E \ {e∗}. This implies that x was not optimal for P (t, d), a
contradiction.
We conclude that x−χe+χg /∈ Bf (d), but y′ = x−χe+χg−χg∗ +χe∗ ∈ Bf (d).
Thus, there exists some set S ⊂ E with x(S) = f(S) and
(3.6) {g, g∗} ⊆ S and {e, e∗} ∩ S = ∅.
It follows that x(S) = y′(S) = f(S).
We proceed to show (a). For the sake of a contradiction, suppose that x − χe +
χg∗ 6∈ Bf (d). Using g ∈ De(y) and, thus, xe = ye ≥ 1, this implies the existence of a
set T ⊂ E with x(T ) = f(T ), g∗ ∈ T , and e 6∈ T . Since y = x − χe∗ + χg∗ ∈ Bf (d),
it follows that e∗ ∈ T . Moreover, since y′ = y − χe + χg ∈ Bf (d) and e 6∈ T , we have
g 6∈ T . Hence, y′(T ) = x(T ) = f(T ). By submodularity of f , the identities x(S) =
y′(S) = f(S) and x(T ) = y′(T ) = f(T ) imply x(S ∩ T ) = y′(S ∩ T ) = f(S ∩ T ) and
x(S∪T ) = y′(S∪T ) = f(S∪T ). Together with g∗ ∈ S∩T and {e, e∗, g}∩(S∩T ) = ∅,
we arrive at the desired contradiction
(3.7) f(S ∩ T ) = x(S ∩ T ) = y′(S ∩ T )− 1 = f(S ∩ T )− 1.
Thus, x− χe + χg∗ ∈ Bf (d), as claimed.
In a similar way, we show (b). For the sake of a contradiction, suppose x−χe∗ +
χg 6∈ Bf (d). Since De∗(x) 6= ∅ and, thus, xe∗ ≥ 1, this implies the existence of a set
U ⊂ E with x(U) = f(U), g ∈ U , and e∗ 6∈ U . Since y′ = x− χe∗ + χg∗ − χe + χg ∈
Bf (d), we further have e ∈ U , and g∗ 6∈ U , implying y′(U) = f(U) and g ∈ S ∩ U .
Just as for (a), x(S) = y′(S) = f(S) and x(U) = y′(U) = f(U) leads to the desired
contradiction
f(U ∩ S) = x(U ∩ S) = y′(U ∩ S)− 1 = f(U ∩ S)− 1.
We have treated all cases and the theorem follows.
In a similar manner, it can be shown that at most a single local improvement step
suffices to obtain a new optimal solution for any parameter shift of type t′ = t−χe∗ .
We conclude with the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3. Let P (t, d) be regular convex optimization problem. Then, for
every optimal solution x∗(t, d) to P (t, d) and every t′ with ‖t− t′‖1 = 1, there is an
optimal solution x∗(t′, d) for P (t′, d) satisfying:
‖x∗(t, d)− x∗(t′, d)‖1 ≤ 2.(3.8)
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We now turn to the impact of a change of the parameter d on optimal solutions
of P (t, d).
Theorem 3.4. Let D ⊂ N denote the set of possible integral values of d. Let
P (t, d) be a family of regular optimization problems with Bf (d) 6= ∅ for all d ∈ D.
Then, for every d, d′ ∈ D with |d− d′| = 1 and every optimal solution x∗(t, d) to
P (t, d), there is an optimal solution x∗(t, d′) for P (t, d′) with
‖x∗(t, d)− x∗(t, d′)‖1 ≤ |d− d
′| = 1.(3.9)
Proof. We here only prove the case d′ = d+1, the case d′ = d−1 follows similarly.
Define the set of resources with slack with respect to x := x∗(t, d) as
S(x) := {e ∈ E : x+ χe ∈ Bf (d+ 1)}.
Since by assumption d + 1 ∈ D and thus Bf (d + 1) 6= ∅, we obtain S(x) 6= ∅ (cf.
Fujishige [11, Theorem 2.3, pp. 35]).
We claim that the solution y := x+ χg∗ is optimal for problem P (t, d
′), where
g∗ ∈ argming∈S(x) C
+
g (xg; tg).
To prove the claim, we show that the optimality conditions of Theorem 3.1 are satis-
fied, i.e., C−e (ye; te) ≤ ∆e(y; t) for all e ∈ E. This is trivial if De(y) = ∅. Otherwise,
we distinguish two cases. If g∗ ∈ argming∈De(y){C
+
g (yg; tg)}, we obtain,
∆e(y; t) = C
+
g∗(yg∗ ; tg∗) ≥ C
+
g∗(xg∗ ; tg∗) ≥ C
−
e (xe; te) = C
−
e (ye; te)
where for the first inequality, we used discrete convexity and for the second inequality,
we used the optimality of x for Bf (d). If g
∗ /∈ argming∈De(y){C
+
g (yg; tg)}, we obtain
∆e(y; t) = min
g∈De(y)
{C+g (yg; tg)} ≥ min
g∈De(x)
{C+g (yg; tg)} = min
g∈De(x)
{C+g (xg; tg)}
≥ C−e (xe; te) = C
−
e (ye; te),
where for the first inequality we used De(x) ⊇ De(y) for all e ∈ E \ {g∗} and for the
second inequality we used the optimality of x for Bf (d).
By inductively applying Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.4 we arrive at the following
result.
Theorem 3.5. Let D ⊂ N denote the set of possible integral values of d and let
P (t, d), d ∈ D be a set of regular optimization problem with Bf (d) 6= ∅ for all d ∈ D.
Then, for every optimal solution x∗(t, d) of P (t, d), d ∈ D, every d′ ∈ D and every
t′, there is an optimal solution x∗(t′, d′) of P (t′, d′) with
‖x∗(t, d) − x∗(t′, d′)‖1 ≤ 2‖t− t
′‖1 + |d− d
′|.(3.10)
Note that for the proof, we can safely use induction on d also for those d’s with
d1, d2 ∈ D, d1 ≤ d ≤ d2, d /∈ D, because Bf (di) 6= ∅, i = 1, 2 implies Bf (d) 6= ∅.
Moreover, regularity of P (t, d) does not depend on d.
The proofs of Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.4 also show that after a parameter
change, a new optimal solution can be recovered by elementary exchange steps, that
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is, by iteratively shifting one unit from one element to another, or, by adding one unit
to an element. We can summarize this discussion as follows.
Corollary 3.6. Let D ⊂ N denote the set of possible integral values of d. Let
P (t, d), d ∈ D be a set of regular optimization problems with Bf (d) 6= ∅ for all d ∈ D.
Then, for every optimal solution x∗(t, d) of P (t, d), d ∈ D, every d′ ∈ D and every t′,
there is an optimal solution x∗(t′, d′) for P (t′, d′) that can be computed from x∗(t, d)
by performing at most ‖t− t′‖1 + |d− d′| elementary exchange steps.
In the following section, we apply the above sensitivity results to a quite general
class of non-cooperative games, thereby establishing an existence and computability
result of pure Nash equilibria.
4. Noncooperative Games on Polymatroids. We consider the following
class of games. There is a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of players and a finite set
E = {1, . . . ,m} of elements. As it is standard in the congestion game literature,
in this section we refer to the elements e ∈ E as resources. Each player i is associated
with a demand di ∈ N and an integral polymatroid rank function fi : 2E → N that to-
gether define a di-truncated integral polymatroid Pfi(di) with base polytope Bfi (di).
A strategy of player i ∈ N is to choose a vector xi = (xi,e)e∈E ∈ Bfi(di), i.e., player i
chooses an integral resource consumption xi,e ∈ N for each resource e such that the
demand di is exactly distributed among the resources and for each U ⊆ E not more
than fi(U) units of demand are distributed to the resources contained in U . Using
the notation xi = (xi,e)e∈E , the set Xi of feasible strategies of player i is defined as
Xi = Bfi(di) =
{
xi ∈ N
E : xi(U) ≤ fi(U) for all U ⊆ E, xi(E) = di
}
,
where, for a set U ⊆ E, we write xi(U) shorthand for
∑
e∈U xi,e. The Cartesian
product X = X1 ×X2 × · · · ×Xn of the players’ sets of feasible strategies is the joint
strategy space. An element x = (xi)i∈N ∈ X is a strategy profile. For a resource e,
and a strategy profile x ∈ X , we write xe =
∑
i∈N xi,e and x−i,e =
∑
j∈N\{i} xj,e.
The private cost of player i under strategy profile x ∈ X is defined as
pii(x) =
∑
e∈E
Ci,e(xi,e;x−i,e).
We assume that every Ci,e fulfills the conditions of Assumption 1. In the remain-
der of the paper, we will compactly represent the strategic game by the tuple G =
(N,X, (di)i∈N , (Ci,e)i∈N,e∈E). We use standard game theory notation. For a player
i ∈ N and a strategy profile x ∈ X , we write x as (xi,x−i). A best response of player i
to x−i is a strategy xi ∈ Xi with pii(xi,x−i) ≤ pii(yi,x−i) for all yi ∈ Xi. A pure
Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile x ∈ X such that for each player i the strategy
xi is a best response to x−i.
4.1. Notable Special Cases. We proceed to illustrate that we obtain the well
known classes of integer-splittable singleton congestion games and matroid congestion
games as special cases of congestion games on integer polymatroids.
4.1.1. Singleton Integer-Splittable Congestion Games. Tran-Thanh et
al. [40] consider singleton integer-splittable congestion games where each player i
is associated with an integral demand di ∈ N that needs to be distributed integrally
over a player-specific subset Ei ⊆ E of resources. Every resource has a non-decreasing
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and convex cost function ce : N→ R+ and the private cost of a player i is equal to
pii(x) =
∑
e∈E
ce(xi,e + x−i,e)xi,e.
We proceed to show that this class of games is contained in the class of polyma-
troid games as a special case.
Proposition 4.1. Singleton integer-splittable congestion games are polymatroid
games.
Proof. For i ∈ N and U ⊆ E, we let
fi(U) =
{
di, if U ∩ Ei 6= ∅
0, otherwise.
For i ∈ N and e ∈ E, we let Ci,e(xi,e;x−i,e) = ce(xi,e+x−i,e)xi,e. First, we show that
the functions fi are normalized, monotone and submodular. For submodularity, it
suffices to show that f(U ∪{v})−f(U) ≥ f(V ∪{v})−f(V ) for all U ⊆ V and v /∈ U .
The inequality can only be violated if f(V ∪ {v})− f(V ) = di which implies v ∈ Ei
and V ∩Ei = ∅. This, however, implies U ∩Ei = ∅ and, thus, f(U ∪{v})−f(U) = di.
We proceed to show that the cost functions are regular provided that ce is non-
decreasing and convex. Discrete convexity is easy to verify. For regularity, we compute
for arbitrary i ∈ N and e ∈ E
C−i,e(x; t+ 1) = ce(x+ t+ 1)x− ce(x+ t)(x − 1)
≤ ce(x+ t+ 1)(x+ 1)− ce(x + t)x
= C−i,e(x+ 1; t),
where the inequality follows since c is non-decreasing.
4.1.2. Matroid Congestion Games with Player-Specific Costs. Acker-
mann et al. [1] studied matroid congestion games with player-specific costs, where
each player i is associated with a matroid Mi = (Ei, Ii, ) defined on some player-
specific subset Ei ⊆ E. The strategy space for every i ∈ N is equal to the set Bi of
bases of Mi. Given a strategy profile (B1, . . . , Bn) with Bj ∈ Bj for all players j, the
private cost of player i is defined as
pii(B1, . . . , Bn) =
∑
e∈Bi
ci,e(|{j ∈ N : e ∈ Bj}|),
where the functions ci,e : N → R+ with i ∈ N and e ∈ E are non-decreasing. We
proceed to show that this class of games is contained in the class of polymatroid games
as a special case.
Proposition 4.2. Matroid congestion games are polymatroid games.
Proof. For a player i we associate with each basis Bi ∈ Bi its characteristic vector
xi(Bi) = (xi,e(Bi))e∈E defined as
xi,e(Bi) =
{
1, if e ∈ Bi
0, otherwise.
It is well known, that for each matroid Mi = (Ei, Ii), there is a function rk : Ei → N,
called the rank function of the matroid, such that
{xi(Bi) : Bi ∈ Bi} = {xi ∈ N
Ei : xi(Ei) = rk(Ei) and xi(U) ≤ rk(U) for all U ⊆ Ei}.
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Moreover, the rank function is normalized, monotone and submodular. We let fi(U) =
rk(U ∩ Ei) and let di = rk(Ei). Then, fi is submodular since for all U, V ∈ 2E we
have
fi(U) + fi(V ) = rk(U ∩ Ei) + rk(V ∩ Ei)
≥ rk((U ∩ Ei) ∪ (V ∩ Ei)) + rk(U ∩ V ∩Ei)
= fi(U ∪ V ) + fi(U ∩ V )
where the inequality uses the submodularity of the rank function.
For i ∈ N and e ∈ E, let
Ci,e(x; t) =
{
ci,e(x+ t), if xi,e = 1
0, if xi,e = 0,
and note that the rank function is subcardinal, i.e., rk(U) ≤ |U | for all U ⊆ E, so that
rk({r}) ≤ 1 for all e ∈ E and, thus, Ci,e is well-defined. As a consequence, we need
to require regularity and discrete convexity only for x ∈ {0, 1}. As for regularity, we
obtain
Ci,e(0; t+ 1) = 0 ≤ ci,e(1 + t) = Ci,e(1; t)
for all t ∈ N by the non-negativity of ci,e. As for discrete convexity, we do not need
to require discrete convexity of the function x 7→ C(x; t) as x only takes two different
values. Moreover, since Ci,e(0; t) = 0 for all t we only have to check that t 7→ Ci,e(1; t)
is discrete convex. To this end, we calculate
C−i,e(1; t) = Ci,e(1 + te)− ci,e(1 + te − 1)
≤ ci,e(1 + te + 1)− ci,e(1 + te),
where we used that ci,r is non-decreasing.
5. Equilibrium Existence. In this section, we give an algorithm that computes
a pure Nash equilibrium for polymatroid games. Our algorithm relies on the two
sensitivity results stated in Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.4.
5.1. The Algorithm. Both sensitivity results are used as the main building
blocks for Algorithm 1 that computes a pure Nash equilibrium for congestion games on
integral polymatroids. Algorithm 1 maintains preliminary demands, strategy spaces,
and strategies of the players denoted by d¯i ≤ di, X¯i = Xi(d¯i), and xi ∈ X¯i, respec-
tively. Initially, d¯i is set to zero for all i ∈ N and the strategy profile, where the
strategy of each player equals the zero vector is a pure Nash equilibrium for this game
in which the demand of each player is zero.
Then, in each round, for some player i the demand is increased from d¯i to d¯i +1,
and a best response yi ∈ X(d¯i + 1) with ‖xi − yi‖1 = 1 is computed, see Line 5 in
Algorithm 1. By Theorem 3.4, such a best response always exists. In effect, the load
on exactly one resource e increases and only those players j with xj,e > 0 on this
resource can potentially decrease their private cost by a deviation. By Theorem 3.2,
a best response of such players consists w.l.o.g. of moving a single unit from this
resource to another resource, see Line 8 of Algorithm 1. As a consequence, during the
while-loop (Lines 7-9), only one additional unit (compared to the previous iteration)
is moved preserving the invariant that only players using a resource to which this
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Fig. 1. Compute PNE
Input: G = (N,X, (di)i∈N , (Ci,e)i∈N,e∈E)
Output: pure Nash equilibrium x
1 d¯i ← 0, X¯i ← Xi(0) and xi ← 0 for all i ∈ N ;
2 for k = 1, . . . ,
∑
i∈N di do
3 Choose i ∈ N with d¯i < di;
4 d¯i ← d¯i + 1; X¯i ← Xi(d¯i);
5 Choose a best response yi ∈ X¯i with ‖yi − xi‖1 = 1;
6 xi ← yi;
7 while ∃i ∈ N who can improve in G¯ = (N, X¯, d¯, (Ci,e)i∈N,e∈E) do
8 Compute a best response yi ∈ X¯i with ‖yi − xi‖1 = 2;
9 xi ← yi;
10 Return x;
additional unit is assigned may have an incentive to profitably deviate. Thus, if the
while-loop is left, the current strategy profile x is a pure Nash equilibrium for the
reduced game G¯ = (N, X¯, d¯, (Ci,e)i∈N,e∈E).
Now we are ready to prove the main existence result.
Theorem 5.1. Polymatroid games possess a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We prove by induction on the total demand d =
∑
i∈N di of the input
game G = (N,X, (di)i∈N , (Ci,e)i∈N,e∈E) that Algorithm 1 computes a pure Nash
equilibrium of G.
For d = 0, this is trivial. Suppose that the algorithm works correctly for games
with total demand d− 1 for some d ≥ 1 and consider a game G with total demand d.
Let us assume that in Line 3, the algorithm always chooses a player with minimum
index. Consider the game G′ = (N,X, (d′i)i∈N , (Ci,e)i∈N,e∈E) that differs from G only
in the fact that the demand of the last player n is reduced by one, i.e. d′i = di for
all i < n and d′n = dn − 1. Then, when running the algorithm with G
′ as input, the
d − 1 iterations (of the for-loop) are equal to the first d − 1 iterations when running
the algorithm with G as input. Thus, with G as input, we may assume that after the
first d − 1 iterations, the preliminary strategy profile that we denote by x′ is a pure
Nash equilibrium of G′.
We analyze the final iteration k = d of the algorithm in which the demand of
player n is increased by 1 (see Line 4). In Line 5, a best reply yn with ‖xn−yn‖1 = 1
is computed which exists by Lemma 3.4. Then, as long as there is a player i that can
improve unilaterally, in Line 8, a best response yi with ‖yi − xi‖1 = 2 is computed
which exists by Lemma 3.2.
It remains to show that the while-loop in Lines 7–9 terminates. To prove this, we
give each unit of demand of each player i ∈ N an identity denoted by ij , j = 1, . . . , di.
For a strategy profile x, we define r(ij ,x) ∈ E to be the resource to which unit
ij is assigned in strategy profile x. Let x
l be the strategy profile after Line 8 of
the algorithm has been executed the l-th time, where we use the convention that x0
denotes the preliminary strategy profile when entering the while-loop. As we chose
in Line 5 a best reply yn of player n with ‖xn − yn‖1 = 1, there is a unique resource
e0 such that x
0
e0
= x′e0 + 1 and x
0
e = x
′
e for all e ∈ E \ {e0}. Furthermore, because
we choose in Line 8 a best response yi with ‖yi − xi‖1 = 2, a simple inductive claim
shows that after each iteration l of the while-loop, there is a unique resource el ∈ E
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such that xlel = x
′
el
+ 1 and xle = x
′
e for all e ∈ E \ {el}.
For any xl during the course of the algorithm, we define the marginal cost of unit
ij under strategy profile x
l as
∆ij (x
l) =
{
C−i,e(x
l
i,e;x
l
−i,e), if e = e(ij ,x
l) = el
C−i,e(x
l
i,e;x
l
−i,e + 1), if e = e(ij ,x
l) 6= el.
(5.1)
Intuitively, if e(ij ,x
l) = el, the value ∆ij (x
l) measures the cost saving on resource
e(ij ,x
l) if ij (or any other unit of player i on resource e(ij,x
l)) is removed from
e(ij ,x
l). If e(ij ,x
l) 6= el, the value ∆ij (x
l) measures the cost saving if ij is removed
from e(ij,x
l) after the total allocation has been increased by one unit by some other
player. For a strategy profile x we define ∆(x) = (∆ij (x))i=1,...,n,j=1,...,di to be the
vector of marginal costs and let ∆¯(x) be the vector of marginal costs sorted in non-
increasing order. We claim that ∆¯(x) decreases lexicographically during the while-
loop. To see this, consider an iteration l in which some unit ij of player i is moved
from resource el−1 to resource el.
For proving ∆¯(xl) <lex ∆¯(x
l−1), we first observe that we only have to care for
∆-values that correspond to units ij of the deviating player i, because for all players
h 6= i we obtain ∆hj (x
l−1) = ∆hj (x
l) for all j = 1, . . . , dh. This follows immediately
if hj is neither assigned to el−1 nor to el. If hj is assigned to el−1 or el, then we
switch the case in (5.1), and the claimed equality still holds. It remains to consider
the ∆-values corresponding to the units of the deviating player i. Recall that the
deviation of player i consists of moving unit ij from resource el−1 to resource el. We
obtain
∆ij (x
l−1) = C−i,el−1 (x
l−1
i,el−1
;xl−1−i,el−1)
> C+i,el (x
l−1
i,el
;xl−1−i,el)
= C−i,el (x
l−1
i,el
+ 1;xl−1−i,el)
= C−i,el (x
l
i,el
;xl−i,el )
= ∆ij (x
l),
where the strict inequality follows since player i strictly improves. For every unit im
of player i that is assigned to resource el as well, i.e, e(im,x
l) = e(ij,x
l) = el, we
have ∆ij (x
l) = ∆im(x
l) since the ∆-value is the same for all units of a single player
assigned to the same resource. The ∆-values of such units im might have increased,
but only to the ∆-value of unit ij .
Next, consider the ∆-values of a unit im assigned to resource el−1, i.e., e(im,x
l) =
e(ij ,x
l−1) = el−1. We obtain
∆im(x
l) = C−i,el−1 (x
l
i,el−1
;xl−i,el−1 + 1)
= C−i,el−1 (x
l−1
i,el−1
− 1;xl−1−i,el−1 + 1)
≤ C−i,el−1 (x
l−1
i,el−1
;xl−1−i,el−1 )
= ∆im(x
l−1),
where for the inequality we used that Ci,el−1 is regular. Altogether, the ∆-values of all
units of all players h 6= i have not changed, for player i, the ∆-values of remaining units
assigned to resource el−1 decreased, and the ∆-values assigned to resource el increased
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exactly to ∆ij (x
l) which is strictly smaller than ∆ij (x
l−1). Thus, ∆¯(xl) <lex ∆¯(x
l−1)
follows.
The following corollary states an upper bound on the number of iterations of the
algorithm in terms of δ = maxi∈N di.
Corollary 5.2. The number of iterations is at most n2mδ3.
We analyze the worst-case runtime of Algorithm 1. To this end, let us consider
the iterations of the algorithm for fixed k. In the proof of Theorem 5.1, we showed
that for fixed k, for each player, the sorted vector of marginal costs (as defined in
(5.1)) decreases lexicographically during the while-loop. Moreover, the marginal cost
of a particular unit of demand ij of player i assigned to a resource e does not depend
on the aggregated demand
∑
j∈N xj,e of all players for resource e, but only on the
number of units of demand xi,e assigned to e by player i. We derive that for each
player i and each resource e at most di different marginal cost values can occur. This
implies that each unit of demand of player i visits each resource at most di times.
Thus, the total number of iterations of the while-loop is bounded by
∑
i∈N (m · d
2
i ).
Setting δ = maxi∈N di, this expression is bounded by nmδ
2, where n = |N |. Using
that there are
∑
i∈N di ≤ n · δ iterations of the for-loop, the claimed result follows.
6. Non-Polymatroid Regions. The proofs of the results obtained in § 3 and
§ 4 relied on the fact that the function f is submodular and, thus, the feasible region
of the optimization problem and the strategy spaces of the players, respectively, are
polymatroids. One may wonder whether polymatroids are the maximal combinato-
rial structure for which these results hold. In this section, we will give an affirmative
answer to this question. In fact, we will work towards showing that for every nor-
malized, monotonic and non-submodular function f , there is a convex and regular
optimization problem with feasible set
Bf (d) =
{
x ∈ NE : x(U) ≤ f(U) for all U ⊆ E, x(E) = d
}
(6.1)
with d ∈ N such that the sensitivity results of Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.4 do not
hold. Moreover, there is a game with convex and regular cost functions where the
players’ strategies are isomorphic to (6.1) that has not a pure Nash equilibrium. This
implies that also for the existence result of Theorem 5.1 the polymatroid structure is
maximal.
For ease of exposition, we assume that f is strictly positive in the sense that
f(U) > 0 for all U ∈ 2E \ ∅. This assumption can be made without loss of generality
since a non-empty set of resources U with f(U) = 0 is not used in any strategy anyway
and, thus, can effectively be removed from E.
Formally, let
X (d) =
{
Bf (d) : f is strictly positive, normalized and monotonic
}
,
X ∗(d) =
{
Bf (d) : f is strictly positive, normalized, monotonic, and submodular
}
denote the feasible regions that can be described by arbitrary and submodular func-
tions f , respectively.
First, note that X (1) = X ∗(1). To see this, note that f({e}) ≥ 1 as f is strictly
positive, so f does not encode any constraints on where the single unit of demand can
be put. Thus, the set of strategies can be described equivalently by a function f ′ with
f ′(U) = 1 for all U ∈ 2E \ {∅}. It is straightforward to verify that f ′ is submodular.
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More interestingly, already for d = 2, the feasible regions contained in X (2) and
X ∗(2) differ. We start with the following observations regarding the feasible regions
in X (2) \ X ∗(2).
Lemma 6.1. For any X ∈ X (2)\X ∗(2) there are f : 2E → N and S, T ∈ 2E such
that
1. X = Bf (2) =
{
x ∈ NE : x(U) ≤ f(U) for all U ⊆ E, x(E) = 2
}
,
2. For any constraint x(U) ≤ f(U), there is x ∈ Bf (2) with x(U) = f(U).
3. f(S) = f(T ) = f(S ∩ T ) = 1 and f(S ∪ T ) = 2.
Proof. Since X ∈ X (2), there is a strictly positive, normalized and monotonic
function f with X = Bf (d). Note that f is not submodular since X ∈ X ∗(2),
otherwise.
To prove 2., suppose that there is U ′ ⊆ R such that x(U ′) < f(U ′) for all
x ∈ Bf (2). Consider the new function f ′ : 2E → N defined as
f ′(U) =
{
f(U), if U 6= U ′,
f(U)− 1, if U = U ′.
By construction Bf (2) = Bf ′(2). Applying the above argumentation on f
′, we de-
rive that f ′ is not submodular as well. Decreasing the right-hand side of non-tight
constraints iteratively in this manner, we finally obtain a non-submodular function
f : 2E → N with X = Bf (2) such that for any constraint of type x(U) ≤ f(U), there
is x ∈ Bf (2) with x(U) = f(U).
To prove 3, first note that x(E) = 2 together with the second statement of the
lemma implies that f(U) ≤ 2 for all U ⊆ E. Since f is not submodular, there are
sets S, T ∈ 2E such that
f(S) + f(T ) < f(S ∩ T ) + f(S ∪ T ).(6.2)
It is straightforward to verify that this inequality can only be satisfied when S and
T are non-empty. We claim that S ∩ T is non-empty as well. For the sake of a
contradiction, let us assume that (6.2) is satisfied by S, T ∈ 2E \ ∅ with S ∩ T = ∅.
Using the second statement of the lemma, there is a vector x ∈ Bf (2) such that the
constraint x(S ∪ T ) ≤ f(S ∪ T ) is tight, i.e., x(S ∪ T ) = f(S ∪ T ). Since S and T are
disjoint, we obtain x(S∪T ) = x(S)+x(T ) ≤ f(S)+f(T ) < f(S∪T ), a contradiction.
We have established that S, T and S∩T are non-empty. Using the strict positivity of
f , this implies that f(S) ≥ 1, f(T ) ≥ 1 and f(S∩T ) ≥ 1. Together with f(S∪T ) ≤ 2
and the monotonicity of f , this implies that
f(S) = f(T ) = f(S ∩ T ) = 1 and f(S ∪ T ) = 2,(6.3)
as claimed.
We proceed to give two additional lemmas that give further structural results
regarding the sets S, T ∈ 2E \ ∅ for which the submodularity constraints are violated.
First we show that each strategy whose support is contained in S ∪ T does not use a
resource in S ∩ T .
Lemma 6.2. Let f : 2E → N and S, T ∈ 2E be as guaranteed by Lemma 6.1.
Then for any x ∈ Bf (2) with supp(x) ⊆ S ∪ T we have supp(x) ∩ (S ∩ T ) = ∅.
Proof. Suppose there is x ∈ Bf (d) and a resource e ∈ E with supp(x) ⊆ S ∪ T
and r ∈ supp(x) ∩ S ∩ T . Because x is integral and f(S ∩ T ) = 1, this implies that
x(e) = 1. Since x(R) = 2 = x(S ∪ T ) and x(S ∩ T ) ≤ 1 there is another element
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e′ 6= e with e′ ∈ S∆T and x(e′) = 1. It is without loss of generality to assume that
e′ ∈ S \ T . This, however, implies that x(S) ≥ x(e) + x(e′) = 2, a contradiction to
x(S) ≤ 1.
Combining the two previous lemmas, we derive the existence of four distinct
critical elements which are used by two vectors with disjoint supports.
Lemma 6.3. Let f : 2E → N be as guaranteed by Lemma 6.1. Then, there are
four distinct elements e1, e2, e3, e4 ∈ E and two vectors x,y ∈ Bf (2) with the following
properties:
1. x(e1) = x(e2) = 1 for some e1 ∈ E \ (S ∪ T ) and e2 ∈ S ∩ T .
2. y(e3) = y(e4) = 1 for some e3 ∈ S \ T and e4 ∈ T \ S.
3. For all other strategies z ∈ Bf (2) \ {x,y} with supp(z) ⊆ {e1, e2, e3, e4} one
of the following three cases holds:
(a) supp(z) = {e1, e3}.
(b) supp(z) = {e1, e4}.
(c) supp(z) = {e1}.
Proof. By Lemma 6.1, there is a strategy x for which the constraint x(S ∩T ) ≤ 1
is tight. This implies the existence of a element e2 ∈ S ∩ T with x(e2) = 1. By
Lemma 6.2, supp(x) 6⊆ S ∪ T implying the existence of a element e1 ∈ E \ (S ∪ T )
with x(e1) = 1.
By Lemma 6.1, there is also another strategy y for which the constraint x(S∪T ) ≤
2 is tight. First note that y(r) ≤ 1 for all r ∈ S ∪ T as otherwise the constraint
y(S) ≤ f(S) = 1 or y(T ) ≤ f(T ) = 1 would be violated. This implies the existence of
two distinct elements e3, e4 ∈ S ∪ T such that y(e3) = y(e4) = 1. Further note that
e3, e4 /∈ S ∩ T as otherwise Lemma 6.2 is violated. Using y(S) ≤ 1 and y(T ) ≤ 1, we
derive that e3 ∈ S \ T and e4 ∈ T \ S.
To see the last part of the claim, note that any strategy z with e2 ∈ supp(z) ⊆
{e1, e2, e3, e4} must have supp(z) = {e1, e2} as otherwise the constraint z(S) ≤ 1
or z(T ) ≤ 1 is violated. Thus, z = x for any such z. Similarly, note that any
strategy z with a singleton support supp(z) = {e} with e ∈ {e1, e2, e3, e4} must have
supp(z) = {e1}, as otherwise the constraint z(S) ≤ 1 or z(T ) ≤ 1 is violated. These
two observations leave only room for the strategies as in part 3. of the statement of
the lemma.
6.1. Violation of Sensitivity Results (Corollary 3.3) and Theorem 3.4.
We first show that for any feasible region X ∈ X (2)\X∗(2) that is not described by a
submodular capacity constraint, the sensitivity results of Corollary 3.3 does not hold.
Theorem 6.4. For any X ∈ X (2) \X∗(2), there is an optimization problem of
the form
minimize
∑
e∈E
Ce(xe; te)
subject to x ∈ X,
and t, t′ ∈ NE such that ‖t− t′‖1 = 1 but ‖x∗(t, 2)− x∗(t′, 2)‖1 > 2.
Proof. By Lemma 6.3, there are four critical elements e1, e2, e3, e4 such that X
can be decomposed in the following way:
X = {x,y} ∪Xcrit ∪Xout,
where supp(x) = {e1, e2}, supp(y) = {e3, e4}. The set
Xcrit =
{
z ∈ X : supp(z) ∈ {{e1, e3}, {e1, e4}, {e1}}
}
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contains an arbitrary subset of vectors whose support is a subset of the four critical
resources, but that are not contained in {x,y}. By Lemma 6.3, the only supports
that can occur for vectors in Xcrit are {{e1, e3},{e1, e4} and {e1}. Finally, the set
Xout contains all vectors whose support contains a non-critical element.
Let
Ce(xe; te) = (xe + te)
2 for e ∈ {e1, e2},
Ce(xe; te) = (xe + te)
2 + 1/2, for e ∈ {e3, e4},
Ce(xe; te) = 20 for all e ∈ E \ {e1, e2, e3, e4}.
and consider the parameter vectors t = 0 and t′ = χe2 . It is easy to see that
x∗(t, 2) = χe1 + χe2 is the unique optimal solution for parameter vector t. On the
other hand, for t′ the unique optimal solution is x∗(t′, 2) = χ3 + χ4. We note that
‖x∗(t, 2)− x∗(t′, 2)‖1 = 4 even though ‖t− t′‖1 = 1 proving the claimed result.
With the same construction, it is also not hard to verify, that also Theorem 3.4
does not continue to hold for any feasible region that is not a polymatroid.
Theorem 6.5. For any X ∈ X (2) \X∗(2), there is an optimization problem of
the form
minimize
∑
e∈E
Ce(xe; te)
subject to x ∈ X,
and d, d′ ∈ NE and t ∈ NE such that |d− d′| = 1 but ‖x∗(t, d)− x∗(t, d′)‖1 > 1.
Proof. With the same construction as in the proof of Theorem 6.4, we compute
that the unique optimal solution for t = χe2 and d = 1 is x
∗(χe2 , 1) = χe1 . However,
as argued in the proof of Theorem 6.4, x∗(χe2 , 2) = χe3+χe4 . We obtain ‖x
∗(χe1 , 2)−
x∗(χe2 , 2)‖1 = 3 proving the claimed result.
6.2. Violation of the Existence of Equilibria (Theorem 5.1). We proceed
to show that also the existence result for pure Nash equilibria of Theorem 5.1 does
not continue to hold. In fact for any non-polymatroid structure X ∈ X (2) \ X ∗(2)
there is a two-player game where both players’ strategies are isomorphic to X that
does not habe a pure Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 6.6. For any X ∈ X (2) \ X ∗(2), there is a two-player game in which
the strategy set of both players is isomorphic to Bf (2) and that does not have a pure
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let f be as guaranteed by Lemma 6.1. By Lemma 6.3, for every player i ∈
{1, 2}, there are four critical resources e1i , e
2
i , e
3
i , e
4
i such that the strategy set Xi of
player i can be decomposed as
Xi = {xi,yi} ∪X
opt
i ∪X
out
i ,
where supp(xi) = {e1i , e
2
i } and supp(yi) = {e
3
i , e
4
i }. The set
Xcriti =
{
zi ∈ Xi : supp(zi) ∈
{
{e1i , e
3
i }, {e
1
i , e
4
i }, {e
1
i}
}}
contains a possibly empty subset of strategies whose support is contained in the set
of critical resources {e1i , e
2
i , e
3
i , e
4
i }, and the set
Xouti =
{
zi ∈ Xi : supp(zi) \ {e
1
i , e
2
i , e
3
i , e
4
i } 6= ∅
}
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strategy y2 x2 X
crit
2︷ ︸︸ ︷ X
out
2
supp {a, h} {b, g} {a, g} {h, g} {g}
y1 {a, b} 1+1, 1+0 0+1, 0+2 1+1, 1+2 0+1, 0+2 0+1, 2+2 · ,≥20
x2 {h, g} 0+0, 1+2 0+3, 0+2 0+3, 1+2 0+3, 2+2 0+6, 2+2 · ,≥20
Xcrit
1


{a, g} 1+0, 1+0 0+3, 0+2 1+3, 1+2 0+3, 0+2 0+6, 2+2 · ,≥20
{b, g} 1+0, 1+0 1+3, 0+2 1+3, 1+2 1+3, 0+2 1+6, 2+2 · ,≥20
{g} 3+3, 1+0 6+6, 0+2 6+6, 1+2 6+6, 0+2 9+9, 2+2 · ,≥20
Xout
1 ≥20, · ≥20, · ≥20, · ≥20, · ≥20, · ≥20,≥20
Fig. 2. Game without a Nash equilibrium as constructed in the proof of Theorem 6.6
contains a possibly empty subset of strategies that contains a non-critical resource
e ∈ E \ {e1i , e
2
i , e
3
i , e
4
i }. Next we describe how the set of strategies of both players are
interweaved. For our purposes it is sufficient, to specify the critical resources of the
two players. To this end, let a, b, h, g be four resources such that
e11 = g, e
1
2 = g,
e21 = e, e
2
2 = h,
e31 = a, e
3
2 = a,
e41 = b, e
4
2 = b.
Consider the following player-specific cost functions
c1,a(x) = max{0, x− 1}, c2,a(x) = 1,
c1,b(x) = 1, c2,b(x) = 0,
c1,h(x) = 0, c2,h(x) = max{0, 2x− 2},
c1,g(x) = max{0, 3x− 3}, c2,g(x) = 2.
For any non-critical resource e ∈ E \ {a, b, e, g}, we define
c1,e(x) = 20, c2,e(x) = 20.
For a player i ∈ {1, 2} and e ∈ E, we let Ci,e(xe;x−i,e) := ci,e(xi,e + x−i,e)xi,e.
The resulting private costs of the players are shown in Fig. 2. Note that by Lemma 6.3,
for every player i we are only guaranteed the existence of the two strategies xi and
yi shown in the upper left part of the bimatrix. As shown in Lemma 6.3, any other
strategy zi contains either a non-critical resource and is, thus, contained in the subset
of strategies Xouti or contains only critical resources and is contained in the subset of
strategies Xcriti . The bimatrix in Fig. 2 has the property that there is no pure Nash
equilibrium, no matter which subset of the strategies in Xcriti or whether a strategy
in Xouti is actually present. We may thus conclude, that no matter how the sets of
strategies described by f specifically look like, no pure Nash equilibrium exists.
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